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Abstract 
Organisations need networks to leverage external knowledge, particularly for SMEs with their limited 
resources. Organisations use networks for knowledge sharing to foster innovation. This use of networks 
bears risks like the unwanted spill-over of knowledge. Consequently, organisations need to balance 
sharing and protecting knowledge. While scholars have extensively investigated the sharing perspective, 
they have so far neglected knowledge protection in network settings and especially the interplay between 
sharing and protection. This paper illuminates the motives and practices of network members switching 
from open sharing to stronger protection on the basis of 53 interviews with members from 10 SME 
networks. We describe three patterns of switching behaviour and explain how the interviewees adapt 
the use of collaborative IT to manage the switches. Employees switch from sharing to being open to (a) 
a certain extent, (b) a certain group, or (c) a certain topic. We find that the three types of switching 
behaviour are related to network characteristics and to corresponding adaptions in using collaborative 
IT. Collaborative IT does not necessarily hamper knowledge protection, but adapted use can support 
both knowledge sharing and knowledge protection. We argue that organisations should develop protec-
tion capabilities to manage the switches. 
Keywords: knowledge protection, knowledge sharing, networks, collaborative IT. 
1 Introduction 
Networks are forms of collaboration between organisations that become more and more important for 
firms to acquire knowledge (Trkman and Desouza, 2012). Sharing and collaboratively developing 
knowledge in networks is highly important since individual firms and particularly small and medium-
sized enterprises (SME) have limited resources to leverage knowledge (Easterby‐Smith et al., 2008, 
Wagner and Bukó, 2005). The use of collaborative information technology (IT) in networks has grown 
since it provides expanding opportunities for knowledge sharing (Trkman and Desouza, 2012). Sharing 
is one of the most important purposes, if not the raison d’être of networks. However, there are also risks 
for organisations sharing knowledge in networks, such as the unwanted spill-over of competitive 
knowledge to competitors which has not only detrimental effects for the affected member, but also for 
the whole network because it can hinder knowledge sharing (Trkman and Desouza, 2012). Empirical 
evidence shows that practitioners still hardly pay attention to the protection of knowledge, though 
(Jennex and Durcikova, 2014).  
While scholars have extensively investigated knowledge sharing or transfer in networks (e.g., Tsai, 
2001, Wagner and Bukó, 2005) and its IT support (e.g., Lertpittayapoom et al., 2007, Roberts, 2000), 
little attention has been paid to the protection of knowledge in networks. The few scholars that investi-
gated topics related to knowledge protection on the network level focused on the identification of 
knowledge risks in networks (Trkman and Desouza, 2012) or risks for organisations imposed by social 
media (Väyrynen et al., 2013). Further, IT artefacts to manage protection have hardly been studied (e.g., 
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Bertino et al., 2006). However, networks are only viable as long as their members are willing to share 
and jointly develop knowledge and this requires that members can also protect their competitive 
knowledge. Therefore, we need to better understand how members of networks address the tension be-
tween sharing and protection. 
We address this research gap by investigating how network members switch from being open towards 
being protective on the basis of 53 interviews with members from 10 SME networks. We describe three 
patterns with episodes of switching and explain how the interviewees adapted collaborative IT for this 
purpose. In section 2, we introduce the concepts that build the basis for our study, i.e. knowledge sharing 
and knowledge protection. Section 3 explains the procedure of our study. We describe the interview 
sample and the methods we applied for data collection and analysis. Section 4 presents the results, i.e., 
the network descriptions and the three switching patterns. We discuss our findings in section 5 and 
provide a conclusion and an outlook on further research in section 6. 
2 Related Work 
“Knowledge transfer in organisations is the process through which one unit is affected by the experience 
of another” (Argote and Ingram, 2000). Several hurdles appear when we intend to transfer knowledge 
across different contexts (Argote and Ingram, 2000). Difficulties in absorbing knowledge increase with 
a decreasing contextual linkage between receiver and knowledge (Reagans and Mcevily, 2003). Thus, 
the transferability and absorbability of knowledge highly depends on the receiver’s characteristics (Bou-
Llusar and Segarra-Cipre´S, 2006). Sharing in networks has the advantage that the characteristics of the 
knowledge sender and receiver are similar to a certain extent, which facilitates the knowledge transfer. 
Organisations engaged in networks assumedly better understand the requirements of their partners and 
thus prepare knowledge in such a way that the effort for adapting it for other member organisations is 
reduced (Malhotra et al., 2005, Lin et al., 2012). Different network structures represent different oppor-
tunities for a member organisation to access new knowledge (Tsai, 2001) but also to loose knowledge 
by accident. 
Knowledge protection is an important contributor to successful knowledge management (Jennex and 
Zyngier, 2007) and concerns the prevention of (a) unwanted knowledge spill-overs (Ahmad et al., 2014), 
(b) knowledge loss (Jennex and Durcikova, 2013), and (c) the reduction of knowledge visibility (Lee et 
al., 2007). (a) focuses on leaking knowledge to unauthorised people, (b) deals with leaving or retiring 
employees, and (c) is concerned with observability of knowledge by externals. Previous research 
showed that SMEs often do not have the resources to implement formal protection measures such as 
patents and trade secrets and therefore rely more on informal protection measures (Leiponen and Byma, 
2009, De Faria and Sofka, 2010). The risk of knowledge spill-overs is typically addressed through se-
crecy or complex design (De Faria and Sofka, 2010). However, SMEs perceive secrecy not as a very 
effective strategy (Leiponen and Byma, 2009). 
Knowledge protection literature mostly fails to consider the IT artifact as it originates in the research 
field of strategic management (Manhart and Thalmann, 2015). Most knowledge protection literature has 
a nominal view on the IT artifact, considering it as absent although used incidentally or as background 
information (e.g., Kale et al., 2000, Arundel, 2001). Analyzing how SMEs use IT to protect their 
knowledge can be a starting point to address this gap. Knowledge sharing in networks has been investi-
gated in terms of influencing factors (Wagner and Bukó, 2005) or risks (Trkman and Desouza, 2012) 
but has not yet described the motives and practices of switching between sharing and protection, partic-
ular in network settings. Further, knowledge protection literature also stresses the need for finding a 
balance between sharing and protecting knowledge without having a solution so far (Thalmann et al., 
2014). Scholars propose frameworks to balance sharing and protecting (e.g., Baughn et al., 1997), how-
ever, there is still limited knowledge on how organisations try to manage this balance especially under 
the light of emerging social software (Manhart and Thalmann, 2015). Further, a large part of literature 
on knowledge protection focuses on the effective application of formal or informal measures (Hertzfeld 
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et al., 2006, Thalmann and Manhart, 2013). However, organisations need to consider their protective 
capabilities to achieve and sustain competitive advantage (Andersén, 2012). 
We follow the scholarly call for more research on knowledge protection in networks by recommending 
to explore the use of IT, to focus also on informal networks (Manhart and Thalmann, 2015), to focus on 
knowledge protection in social knowledge environments (Pawlowski et al., 2014)  
3 Procedure 
The goal of our study is to investigate how members of networks strike a balance between sharing and 
protecting knowledge by means of switching from open sharing to stronger protection. We collected 
data by means of semi-structured interviews. We interviewed several members of each network in order 
to obtain a multi-perspective view on the knowledge protection behaviour in the network. We asked the 
individuals to describe their personal sharing and protection behaviour acting as representatives of their 
organisations. Therefore, our unit of analysis is the individual representing an organisation that is mem-
ber of one or many networks. 
We conducted 53 semi-structured interviews with employees from the member organisations of ten 
SME networks in construction, healthcare, IT, and engineering between January and October 2014. We 
conducted the interviews in the scope of the LEARNING LAYERS research project, which focuses on 
IT support for informal learning.The networks and key informants were selected based on convenience 
sampling and the networks are affiliated to the research project. We organised our study in two phases. 
First, we interviewed ten key informants who occupied a central role in the network, e.g., network man-
agement, and had a good overview of the network members and activities. The key informant interviews 
took approximately two hours and were conducted face to face. The goal was to get a first overview of 
the networks and to identify promising candidates for the subsequent informant interviews. Each key 
informant represented one of the ten SMEs organised in one of the investigated networks from Germany 
or Austria. Second, we conducted 43 informant interviews with members identified by the key inform-
ants of each network. We interviewed between three and five informants in each of the 10 networks to 
gain a deeper understanding of each network and to create a multi-perspective view on the interplay 
between sharing and protection in the networks. The informant interviews took approximately one hour 
each and were conducted via telephone. We allowed for the interviews to build on each other, comple-
ment, challenge and extend intermediate findings from interview to interview to develop our under-
standing and theorising. Seven interviewees had less than five years, 46 had more than five years of 
working experience with the network which indicates that most interviewees had profound experience 
with the networks. Table 1 provides a description of the investigated networks (sector, number of mem-
ber organisations) and the number of performed interviews. 
 
Network (ID) Sector # Member orgs. # Interviewees 
Network 1 Construction 130 6 
Network 2 Construction 30 6 
Network 3 Construction 92 5 
Network 4 Construction  270 6 
Network 5 Construction  1600 6 
Network 6 Construction 85 5 
Network 7 Information Technology 108 5 
Network 8 Health 63 6 
Network 9 Engineering 83 4 
Network 10 Health 139 4 
Table 1.  Overview of the investigated networks 
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The audio-recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim and cleansed afterwards. Thereby, the raw 
transcripts were checked for accuracy. Additionally, this procedure helped us to get familiar with the 
data material, as not all of us were involved in the data collection to the same degree. Transcriptions 
were translated into English for citing original voice. We analysed the transcripts by applying an in-
formed inductive coding procedure, carried out via Atlas.ti. 
We strived to identify categories from the material itself, not from theoretical considerations (Mayring, 
2014). In line with the inductive category development according to Mayring (2014), we firstly defined 
a criterion for the selection process in category formation as a deductive element within our analysis. 
That is, we defined the dimensions of analysis (collaborative IT, protection behaviour, network charac-
teristics). One author initially scanned 20% of the data material and proposed eight initial codes accord-
ing to these dimensions of analysis. As an example, for collaborative IT “already used IT” and “desired 
IT” was proposed as codes. In parallel, we created a coding table with descriptions of the initial codes, 
an example, and rules for applying the codes. Based on this table, we started the first collaborative 
analysis round focusing on three to five transcripts each. Each team member focused on the assigned 
transcripts covering one network using the table describing the initial eight codes. During this phase the 
initial codes were refined and new codes proposed by each team member. All codes in the sample were 
discussed and clarified in a subsequent discussion round. We did not calculate a value for the inter-coder 
reliability, however, we performed this routine until we had an agreement upon the sample of codes and 
their use amongst the three coders. We found no additional codes for ‘collaborative IT’ and ‘network 
characteristics’, the dimension protection behaviour was changed to ‘switching behaviour’ and three 
additional codes. Two codes for network characteristics were rejected. All in all, we agreed upon the 
following codes on text passages (in brackets quantity of use of this code): collaborative IT: “already 
used IT” (387), “desired IT” (100). Protection behaviour: “open to a certain group” (78), “open to a 
certain topic” (303), and “open to a certain extent” (47). Network characteristics: “geographic proxim-
ity” (141), “professional proximity” (98). Subsequently, we started a second round of coding where we 
coded the entire data set using the new set containing eleven codes. After that, we discussed  all coded 
text passages to have a full agreement on the codes and their use and started with the interpretation of 
the data (Mayring, 2014). 
4 Switching Patterns 
In this section, we first categorise the networks we investigated with the help of the two dimensions 
geographic proximity and professional proximity. We then go on to describe three switching patterns 
from knowledge sharing to knowledge protection and also illuminate how network members adapt their 
use of collaborative IT to be protective.  
4.1 Network Description 
The networks in our sample differ in their geographic reach. A high geographical proximity refers to the 
same local co-presence of network members (Schamp et al., 2004), i.e. they have their locations next to 
each other. We found that the networks in our sample differ in terms of geographical proximity. They 
are either bound to a specific region or they are regionally unbounded. We classified our networks ac-
cording to the network demographics collected during the interviews and by investigating available re-
ports describing the networks. The geographic and the professional (business domain) are the two most 
prominent proximity dimensions we came across in our data analysis. 
The networks also differ in terms of the professional heterogeneity of their members. We characterise a 
network as heterogeneous if its member organisations come from different professional domains or oc-
cupy different roles in the supply chain. We characterise networks as homogeneous if their members 
come from the same or similar professional domains and occupy the same or similar roles in the supply 
chain. We analysed membership lists of each network to identify their roles in the supply chain and to 
determine their professional domains.  
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Comparing our networks according to their members’ geographical and professional proximities, we 
identified four types of networks (see Table 2).  
 
 Regionally unbounded Regionally bounded 
Homogeneous  N3, N4 
Heterogeneous N1, N5 N2, N6, N7, N8, N9, N10 
Table 2. Geographical and professional proximities of the investigated networks 
We acknowledge that there are more dimensions for characterising networks like cognitive or institu-
tional proximity (Boschma, 2005), however, we focus on the two characteristics described here as they 
were the only ones we found sufficient empirical evidence for categorising our networks.  
Eight out of ten networks are regionally bounded and the majority of our sample of ten networks consists 
of six heterogeneous, regionally bounded networks (N2, N6-10). This means a large part of our sample 
consists of networks where the members occupy different roles in the supply chain, work in different 
domains, and are located in a specific region. Further, the sample contains two homogeneous, regionally 
bounded networks (N3, N4), and two heterogeneous, regionally unbounded networks (N1, N5). Finally, 
we have no homogenous, regionally unbounded network in our sample. 
4.2 Open to a certain extent 
Being open to a certain extent describes episodes where members switched from open sharing to hiding 
the details of knowledge. Many interviewees reported about the need to be open to innovate (N1-d): “if 
somebody has a problem with handing on their knowledge, then that is wrong […] this is a mutual give 
and take situation”. We identified that the reluctance to actively contribute, the fear of imitation, and the 
fear of recourse makes members switch from sharing to being open to a certain extent. 
Reluctance to actively contribute: Interviewees highlighted that open sharing suffers from an increasing 
reluctance of members to actively contribute. Some network members actively absorb without sharing 
their own knowledge and, thus, giving and taking is thrown out of balance (N5-e): “Well, put in a nut-
shell, I must say that sucking professional knowledge, to define it that way, has gotten progressively 
worse in the last years”. Another interviewee reported (N1-f): “Our members can present their projects 
at our meetings. They can show what they did, what went bad, what went good. They can discuss about 
that. These opportunities have not been taken up extremely well, though”. We found that, as a conse-
quence, active members stopped the open sharing to prevent being exploited. They started to share only 
high-level knowledge with all members of the network and only provide detailed knowledge to members 
who are willing to compensate (N5-e): “why do I participate as a craftsman, do I just want to waste time 
or do I want to get an order”? Compensation in this case can be to sign a contract.  
We found that network members started to use collaborative IT differently in such situations. First, the 
distribution of detailed knowledge in threads or blogs has been stopped in N5 and interested members 
are invited into using synchronous IT collaboration. This way, members want to regain control about 
who is getting detailed knowledge (N5-e): “Then, I wrote [in the forum] ‘if you have further questions, 
please call me and contact me directly’”. Second, the members established subgroups within the network 
to better coordinate which details of the knowledge should be shared. Hence, some members stopped 
appearing as an individual, but as a coherent group in the network (N5-e): “the people use a highly 
professional platform that really offers a gigantic pool of knowledge in the form of pictures, in the form 
of comments and also links. And the people really are like that today, thrifty is nifty‘[…] I don’t want 
to pay […] Therefore, it is good to create a group as we did […] and then the webmaster has placed the 
links of this team into the platform […] and so we develop a symbiosis in which one pulls the other and 
gets the thing closer to the target […] we can present the team in a self-contained way and share exactly 
the knowledge that we would like to share”. By forming a group-appearance, members can better control 
the detail of knowledge to be provided to other members by making arrangements restricted to group 
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members. Acting as individuals, they are not aware about how much details other members might share. 
If other members share more details, the passive knowledge absorbers might make contracts with mem-
bers that provide more detailed knowledge. 
Fear of imitation: We identified that network members restrict their sharing behaviour due to regular 
on-site meetings where potential competitors participate. Members offer on-site workshops to distribute 
knowledge and to spread the ideas of sustainable construction. The context to understand the shared 
knowledge seems crucial in this respect (N1-a): “Somebody who [tries something] in a seminar, they 
can apply nothing in real. If somebody would get how that is done at the real construction site, then they 
would have the self-confident feeling of ‘Aha! This is what I have to do or to consider or to know”. Rich 
context seems important for effective knowledge sharing since there is no general rule on how to apply 
the knowledge, it always depends on the context. This, however, implies that the knowledge is sticky 
and cannot be easily verbally shared and transferred to other contexts. In other words, participants will 
learn how to do things in a specific context, but not necessarily how to translate this into their own 
context. This would require additional de-contextualised knowledge on how to apply knowledge in other 
contexts. We found that members restrict their sharing at exactly that point. They verbally share 
knowledge and protect documented knowledge (N1-a): “Well, demonstrating and storytelling are com-
pletely open. […]. An architect’s drawing or the complete set of documentation would represent so-to-
say the inherent value that the architect sells and we never hand this on in that sense”. This separation 
between an open verbal expression of detailed knowledge and a restriction of sharing it in explicit form 
enables members to share their experiences without disclosing de-contextualised knowledge. We found 
that members adapt their use of collaborative IT to serve this purpose. For example they use dedicated 
Dropbox-groups to protect documented knowledge (N1-f): “We have many things in different Dropbox 
workspaces with different people at the moment […]. There is one Dropbox for the executive board. 
[…] There is a Dropbox for training and education, one for the interns, one for registration, one for our 
guidelines. Different people take part in these, depending on who contributes and so”. 
Fear of recourse: Another reason why members restrict their open sharing is that they fear recourses 
due to sharing knowledge with a low maturity or with missing legal proof (N1-f): “We just want to make 
sure that we as [network] cannot be held liable for people who are listed on our homepage who do 
something wrong or deal with some construction tasks inappropriately”. However, we found that this 
fear does not only have an effect on who is listed as a network member on the homepage, but that this 
also directly affects how members use forums or homepages for sharing knowledge. Although the forum 
was initiated for open sharing of knowledge, members share general high level knowledge which is 
mature and reliable, but stop sharing innovative, new and not validated knowledge via traceable IT (N1-
e): “I cannot simply write into the forum ‘Hey guys, you can put tiles on clay. Then, this cannot be done 
for whatever reason or somebody forgets the foil or what not. Nobody takes the liberty to accept respon-
sibility. That is the reason you do not find anything there. Therefore, one has to take on that responsi-
bility for oneself”. Consequently, members can find general high-level knowledge on the homepage and 
merely use it as a platform to retrieve information but not to actively share as they only dare to verbally 
discuss their opinions. As a consequence, members only find high-level information on the homepage 
(N1-e): “I can discuss about such things, but I cannot just search the Internet or the homepage or some 
presentation, does this work or does it not. Because there is no rule. There are opinions instead”. 
4.3 Open to a certain group 
Being open to a certain group describes episodes where members switched from open sharing to only 
sharing to a limited sub-group of the network. We found that the local context of networks has implica-
tions on the willingness to share. We found that the extent to which members share knowledge strongly 
depends on the type of collaboration partner (N8-a): “I do not see any restrictions in offering the know-
how that we produce and that we have [in the local] context. Thinking this from the other side, from 
industry, it is completely different. This is understandable. They have internal know-how which is a 
much more strategic asset than what we have”. 
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Difficulty to enforce legal measures: Due to the highly competitive situation paired with the willingness 
to openly innovate, network members establish more formal forms of collaboration based on contracts. 
However, they experience the challenge of limited control over the knowledge due to the different types 
of partners in a collaboration and difficulties in enforcing protection by legal measures (N8-a): “It is 
very, very difficult in [our context] to organise this for ourselves. The difficulty begins with, the question 
is if they ask us [about a non-disclosure agreement] then we go ‘Aha’, they say ok, what we hand on to 
you is of value to us, so please take care of it. The question is and that is what you need to ask as a 
[occupation] do we have the structures and resources to take care of it? We have a fileserver which is 
not protected, if it is about electronic documents. We do not have encrypted emails. We have no right 
as employees to sign such [a non-disclosure agreement]. This must be done by the executive board. The 
executive board […] eventually cannot take the internal responsibility to establish such a process so that 
they could sign this in good faith”. Another interviewee reported (N10-a): “I was advised according to 
patent law and the consultant said that I would not be strong enough to enforce a patent […] to execute 
this. […] I would not be financially strong enough to enforce this against relevant partners even when it 
was justified”. These situations show that the enforcement via legal measures is difficult. The success 
depends on the capabilities of members to be able to enforce the rules. 
We found that member organisations use collaborative IT to circumvent this difficulty of enforcing legal 
measures in their subgroups (N8-b): “For example, we have developed a tool for IPR [intellectual prop-
erty rights] in which every publication, every presentation must be uploaded to the Web and there is a 
time period for objections by [group members] and functionality for commenting. So that publications 
are revised until all agree and this may be published eventually”. Using a tool for managing a release 
process for IPR-relevant documents helps the partners replace contractual agreements by a more collab-
orative and ad-hoc approach of finding an agreement on what to share and what not. Then, this allows 
the formation of larger subgroups in which the enforcement can be checked by IT. 
Uncertainty about collaboration partners’ sharing behaviour: Members experience uncertainty about 
their collaboration partners’ sharing behaviour. Here, members form subgroups in which they share 
competitive knowledge but protect it from other members outside the group (N7-a): “We have our group 
of interest that we co-founded. We have restrictions for it and clear guidelines about how to handle 
information from outside and on the other side of course how to handle things we develop. Guidelines 
about how we handle knowledge that we developed”. Network management helps groups to determine 
sharing and protection behaviour of group members to outsiders. 
Network management implements communication rules and, therefore, acts as a membrane between the 
network members, as an enforcer (N10-b): “If somebody says ‘this knowledge is confidential’ this has 
to be clarified ex ante. […] When somebody presents an innovation during a project meeting, a NDA 
circles in this round. I like to keep things amongst the people that sit around the table”. This way, net-
work management supports members by forwarding knowledge in a “target-member-specific” way (N7-
d): “We send presentations upon request, not in the sense of a newsletter, so that everybody gets every-
thing, but specifically […] so that we ask the creator or owner of the presentation, can we share this, or 
may we hand this on to this person or that person […] or we get a reduced set of slides which we can 
distribute or share on our Web site […] that we simply always have four eyes, at least the four-eyes 
principle, and say is this ok that we share this. Not simply, ‘there is something on the fileshare. That is 
an interesting slide. I hand it on now’”. Without using the “four-eye-principle”, a presentation might be 
unintendedly shared with competing members as there are no IT-based restrictions in place. By acting 
as a membrane, the role of the network management is to keep the members aware of with whom they 
want to share certain knowledge. This episode exemplifies a switch to sharing behaviour that supports 
both, knowledge sharing (“if I share it personally, I know that it is taken up”) and knowledge protection 
(“if I share it personally, I know by whom it is taken up”). Interviewees also highlighted the importance 
of building trust within subgroups (N6-e): “how good do I know somebody? If I know and can take a 
measure of that person, have many things in common, I can better evaluate whether I can share with that 
person or not”. In this regard, IT seems important to increase trust (N6-d): “I always wished for a tool 
that strengthens the community […] the general challenge is to establish a basis of trust. If a member 
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wants information to be treated as confidential they should know that a partner treats information con-
fidential”. 
We found that the network management can provide communication platforms for fostering knowledge 
transfer. However, due to the uncertainty about the sharing behaviour, sharing becomes rather superfi-
cial in N9 while detailed knowledge is only shared personally when members trust each other (N9-d): 
“Of course, what we also offer […] is our data base of competencies. Every network wants such a data 
base. This would be a Facebook of [industry sector]. There I go. I can build communities. I can send 
data back and forth. However, […] it is, as said before, always the personal contacts. That is how we 
generate projects. If it gets more superficial, we can work with such data bases of competencies”. 
4.4 Open to a certain topic 
Being open to a certain topic describes episodes where members switched from sharing their knowledge 
to sharing only knowledge about a certain topic. 
Some networks have other foci than knowledge sharing for innovation like sharing knowledge to achieve 
compliance to laws, and are restrictive towards collaboratively developing innovations. Interviewees 
indicated that originally such networks had also experienced a more open sharing culture which, how-
ever, changed. One interviewee demonstrated this change using the example “topping-out ceremony” 
in the construction industry (N4-f): “Formerly this was the topping-out ceremony. The crafts became 
better because they all sat together during the topping-out ceremony after a building was completed. 
[…] the only opportunity to exchange informal knowledge and informally learn across the crafts. Un-
fortunately, this topping-out ceremony doesn’t exist anymore in this fashion. Hence, a central aspect of 
informal learning has disappeared on this level”. 
The openness for sharing focuses on exchanging knowledge that is not owned by a specific company 
(N3-a): “We talk about issues that are known in principle, which I can look up somewhere. This is not 
worth to be protected like a development aid. If I develop a new engine for example, that is something 
I have to keep to myself at first”. We found that such open knowledge refers to knowledge that concerns 
all members of the network (N4-f): “Any situation where exchange is generated through mistakes, where 
a company has problems like with stipulation, or construction contracts, knowledge is exchanged be-
cause all have the same problems there”. Interviewees reported that topics that concern all members are 
market-related, compliance-related, and legal issues. We found two motives why members switched to 
being open only to a certain topic. 
Legal restrictions to share competitive knowledge: One reason why members only share market, com-
pliance, or legal knowledge is that they are forced by law (N4-b): “the [representatives of the] organi-
sations that were present in the meeting room signed a contract that they do not talk about business or 
project-related things”. They are not allowed to discuss anything related to price rigging, for example. 
We found that the network management uses IT like electronic newsletters or email for distributing 
guidelines to enhance the awareness towards these restrictions (N4-b): “there are guidelines that we 
share before the meetings. This is a matter of the liability of an organisation how we handle this”. Hence, 
networks utilise IT that is dedicated to communicate and distribute in a way that it restricts the sharing 
to a specific topic (N4-f): “they report about new guidelines, new norms. Maybe also about problems 
that occurred. This form of information, i.e., newsletters, […] is sent via email nowadays as a core 
product of [network]”. 
Collaborate with competitive members: Interviewees reported that the network management established 
meetings to share knowledge about the market and legal issues in which also competitors participate. 
Hence, members have to deal with the risk that competitive knowledge could spill over. To reduce that 
risk, the network management has the obligation to decide which type of knowledge should be distrib-
uted after standardisation and anonymisation of the content via collaborative IT (N4-a): “I take over and 
anonymise everything that lands on my desk, also requests. That’s the essential thing. That is I will 
never say ‘a firm has this and that problem’”. We also found that construction sites are environments 
where competitive knowledge can spill over unintentionally. However, the need for collaborating on 
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site drives network members to share only knowledge about certain topics: “we have our own concrete 
mixing plant. Of course, we would not share the recipes of certain concrete mixtures. […] We would 
share knowledge on how to build because we don’t have secrets there […] the more transparent, the 
better for the site supervisors. Otherwise, if you build a road mysteriously, more and more questions 
come up”. This shows that the problems of collaborating with competitors can be amplified by legal 
restrictions. 
Interviewees reported that network homepages are only used for specific, non-competitive knowledge 
(N3-f): “There is a homepage of the network. There is a member section where tips and tricks on legal 
issues are provided […] how to write an adhortatory letter, these general things […] you’ll find less 
domain-specific expertise there”. 
5 Discussion 
We elicited three patterns in which network members switch from open to protective sharing behaviour. 
We described the patterns, highlighted the motives for open knowledge sharing in networks and for 
switching from sharing to protection and described examples of how members consequently adapt their 
use of collaborative IT. In the following, we discuss these patterns in the light of pertinent literature to 
explain our findings in terms of (a) the motives and practices for switching from open to protective, and 
(b) capabilities needed to manage the different switches, and how collaborative IT could enhance these 
capabilities. We elaborate on how members switch in different types of networks. Based on that, we 
discuss capabilities for these categories of networks necessary to foster the respective switching behav-
iour of members, and how the adapted use of collaborative IT could enhance these capabilities. 
5.1 Switching behaviour and network types 
All investigated networks were founded to foster knowledge sharing. However, we found that members 
switched from sharing to being protective in three ways: being open to (a) a certain extent (extent), (b) 
a certain group (group), and (c) a certain topic (topic). We found that sharing and protection should not 
be considered as stable states, i.e., members do not ex ante decide to share or protect, it is rather a 
phenomenon that is influenced by changes in the network itself, such as changes in the community, the 
network structure or network culture. These changes of the network trigger the switches from sharing 
to protection. Thus, we argue that considering network characteristics provides a more accurate under-
standing of sharing and protection phenomena. 
Contrasting network categories with switching patterns, we identified that members from regionally 
unbounded networks rather reduce the details of their shared knowledge while members of regional 
networks rather restrict the sharing to specific groups or topics (see Table 3). The three types of switch-
ing behaviour are not mutually exclusive within a certain type of network, however, we found that being 
open to a certain extent mainly took place in regionally unbounded networks.  
 
 Regionally unbounded Regionally bounded 
Homogeneous  N3 (topic), N4 (topic) 
Heterogeneous N1 (extent), N5 (extent) N2 (group), N6-10 (group) 
Table 3. Geographical and professional proximity related to switching behaviour 
Drawing on literature on proximities, this result is not surprising. Long distances between network mem-
bers exacerbate the exchange of tacit knowledge (Schamp et al., 2004). Co-located members have better 
opportunities to hold face-to-face meetings to share tacit knowledge. Since tacit knowledge is more 
likely to be the source of competitive advantage (Norman, 2002), members are more restrictive and 
completely hide certain types of knowledge (topics). Being open to a certain group also fits well to 
pertinent literature. Geographical proximity correlates with social proximity as it is easier for people to 
meet in person and interact with each other (Handfield and Bechtel, 2002). In other words, the smaller 
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the distance, the more likely is a high social proximity between members (Boschma, 2005). The easier 
adoption and use of knowledge with the same network configuration enhances the risk that local com-
petitors apply leaked knowledge which explains why members only share with trusted subgroups of 
these co-located members. Hence, being open to a certain group seems especially prevalent in networks 
where members have high geographic proximity. We found that members in regionally bounded, ho-
mogeneous networks strongly focus on sharing knowledge about certain topics. We argue that this is 
because homogeneous members have a high professional proximity (cf. Schamp et al., 2004) which 
increases the risk of knowledge absorption. Especially when located in the same region, the risk of losing 
competitive knowledge to a direct competitor is high. Hence, members only share non-competitive 
knowledge. 
Based on the proposition that the switching behaviour of network members depends on the network 
characteristics we will argue in the following that network members need to develop certain capabilities 
to switch towards being protective.  
 
5.2 Protection capabilities to manage switching behaviour 
We identified three patterns of switching behaviour with different requirements regarding knowledge 
protection. Hence, each organisation needs protection capabilities to manage the corresponding switch. 
Competitiveness depends on the capabilities of network members to manage knowledge, here specifi-
cally on protection capabilities to balance sharing and protection of knowledge. Capabilities involve 
complex patterns of various resources and people, and are made up of a sequence of organisational 
routines (Grant, 1991). Various types of protection capabilities have been proposed, such as formal and 
strategic (e.g., De Faria and Sofka, 2009) or organisational (Liebeskind, 1996). The various types of 
capabilities can be aggregated to concealment, ambiguity, and enforcement capabilities (Manhart, 
2015). Concealment describes the capability to reduce the risk that a competitor identifies knowledge. 
Ambiguity describes the capability to reduce the risk that a competitor assimilates knowledge or imitates 
core competencies. Enforcement describes the capability to reduce the risk that a competitor uses the 
assimilated knowledge or imitated core competence in form of business strategies. 
Concealment: Reducing the risk of identification refers to the reduction of knowledge observability. 
This depends on two characteristics: the extent of disclosure (Winter, 1987), as well as the ease of un-
derstanding and examining different parts of knowledge (Zander, 1991). In other words, the success of 
externals to identify knowledge of a focal firm depends on the level of disclosure and whether the 
knowledge can easily be recognised as valuable. 
We suggest that being open to a certain topic is a switching pattern that requires the capability of con-
cealment. That is because members need to hide certain types of knowledge completely. As an example, 
we found that hiding competencies is practiced to avoid headhunting (N8-f): “if we employ a person 
that has unique skills, we hide this person from the company homepage so that others cannot identify 
his skills”. We also found that competitive members organise workshops to be up to date on new stand-
ards and norms or market news while they protect how they build products (N4-b): “in the meeting room 
[…] they do not talk about business or project-related things but […] about market-relevant things” and 
(N4-f): “they report about new guidelines, new norms”. Since we observed that especially members of 
regionally bounded networks with high professional homogeneity perform this switching pattern, con-
cealment capabilities seem of particular interest for them. As a starting point to build concealment ca-
pabilities, organisations need to be able to control the extent of disclosure and the ease of understanding 
by externals. Here, the basis to build routines is a proper classification of knowledge documents 
(Desouza and Vanapalli, 2005) and the traceability of knowledge development in activity streams 
(Pawlowski et al., 2014). This helps members to distinguish the types of knowledge within their organ-
isation. This way, organisations build the ground for classifying knowledge according to its criticality 
and maintain integrity by tracing who accessed and developed the documents. Such documents can be 
managed by collaborative IT for which members can implement role-based access control (Bertino et 
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al., 2006). Thus, organisations can ensure that only certain types of knowledge are identified and ac-
cessed by certain people. Such a technical implementation could support members to manage the process 
of switching and could build the basis for developing routines to conceal knowledge types from other 
network members. 
Ambiguity: It takes more to assimilate new knowledge than just exposing individuals to it (Pennings and 
Harianto, 1992). One way of reducing the risk of unwanted assimilation by other members is to establish 
and maintain causal ambiguity. Causal ambiguity describes the nature of causal relationships between 
actions and results (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) and helps to build barriers to imitation (Reed and 
Defillippi, 1990). In other words, members need to disguise from competitors how they combine 
knowledge to build competencies. A competitor should not be able to see how different parts of the 
knowledge relate to a product or competency. 
We suggest that being open to a certain extent is a switching behaviour that requires the capability of 
ambiguity. That is because members reveal their knowledge on a very high level but disguise detailed 
knowledge. They protect details of their knowledge that are needed to build competencies to develop a 
product. As an example, interviewees reported that they do not reveal detailed knowledge about the 
sensor technology in their products (N8-f): “There are limits […] we work with opto-sensors, [if people 
want to know] what sensors we have in our products, we draw the line there”. This way, other members 
can observe the knowledge but are not able to understand how different aspects relate to each other so 
that they understand causal relationships of knowledge. As we observed that particularly members of 
regionally unbounded networks with low professional proximities perform this switch, ambiguity capa-
bilities to disguise their competencies seem of particular interest for them.  
As a starting point to build ambiguity capabilities, organisations need to be able to determine different 
levels of detail for their knowledge. Based on that, they need to be able to increase the causal ambiguity 
for competitors. This could be done by separating between different versions of documents, i.e. a copy 
intended for externals where the relationship between knowledge components can hardly be detected. 
As an example, members make their software programs more complex before sharing them with com-
petitors (N3-e): “We protect the programs that we write by handing over ‘wrong’ program copies […]. 
This is something we like to do, to make programs so complicated that nobody can read them anymore 
[…] you are not able to make use of it, because the effort is too high to bring everything together”. The 
different versions of knowledge with different levels of detail, then could be managed via role-based 
access control (Bertino et al., 2006). Interviewees explained that they form groups to cope with reluctant 
members and create group appearances on forums. Based on our findings, the complementary use of 
collaborative IT could help in this regard. Providing IT like a group workspace in a forum could enhance 
members’ ambiguity capability by providing coordination space to determine the detail of knowledge 
to be shared. 
Enforcement: Once competitors assimilated knowledge and are able to put it into practice, i.e. build a 
business strategy that exploits the assimilated knowledge best by assuring appropriability of returns 
(Maier, 2007, Grant, 1991), members need to enforce protection. There are two main ways to protect 
knowledge after being disclosed and assimilated. Protection (1) via IPR (Hertzfeld et al., 2006, 
Liebeskind, 1996) and (2) building trust to prevent externals from opportunistic behaviour (Norman, 
2002). We found that members switch to being open to a certain group for these two reasons. 
We suggest that being open to a specific group is a switching behaviour that requires the capability of 
enforcement. That is because members establish trust by forming subgroups where they can openly 
share. As an example, interviewees reported that they try to combine both legal protection and trusted 
relationships: they found working groups where they want to openly share and drive innovations since 
they enable to get to know each member in the group better but at the same time sign a letter of intent 
and NDA to assure that openly sharing has no serious consequences (N7-e): “A working group is 
founded but still on a level that not all share in a way that it is useful for the group […]. If there is an 
NDA or a letter of intent of such a group, this would enable to go this way more serious”. As we observed 
that especially members of regionally bounded networks with low professional proximities perform this 
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switching pattern, enforcement capabilities seem of particular interest for them. We argue that the defi-
nition of confidentiality levels for knowledge linked to groups is crucial to build enforcement capabili-
ties. Based on that, IT could help to overcome the challenge to manage the submission and approval of 
NDAs (Prajapati et al., 2013) with various stakeholders or the violations of IPR. Based on our findings, 
the complementary use of collaborative IT could support members to address this challenge. As an ex-
ample, network management could provide an IPR management tool (e.g., Bellini et al., 2013) that 
focuses on increasing transparency in the dissemination process and requires commitment from all mem-
bers of the group. This way, organisations could circumvent the problem of enforcing legal measures 
and simultaneously increase the trust between members due to increased transparency. 
The following table depicts the identified patterns of switching behaviour, triggers of the switch, col-
laborative IT used, and the protection capabilities needed to manage the switch.  
 
 Open to certain extent Open to certain group Open to certain topic  
Description Share general knowledge & 
protect details 
Share with subgroups 
of the network 
Share knowledge only 
about a certain topic 
Trigger  Reluctance to contribute 
 Fear of imitation  
 Fear of recourse 
 Problems to enforce 
legal measures 
 Uncertainty about 
sharing behaviour 
 Legal restrictions to 
share about topic 
 Collaboration with 
competitors 
Collaborative IT Use forums/ blogs for high 
level sharing and synchro-
nous communication for de-
tailed sharing 
IPR tool to enforce 
NDAs: collaboratively 
agree on dissemination 
Use of collaborative IT 
to increase awareness 
towards knowledge 
protection 
Protection capa-
bility 
Ambiguity Enforcement Concealment 
Table 4. Description of the three Switching Patterns 
We also see several shortcomings and limitations of our study. First and in line with exploratory case 
study designs, we do not claim generalisability of our findings, as we do not use a representative sample. 
We do not claim completeness of our switching patterns, e.g., network members might switch back from 
being protective to being more open. We did not explicitly focus on such phenomena and we only found 
evidence for switching from openly sharing to being more protective and not vice versa. Another limi-
tation is that we conducted the interviews in German and translated them into English. We minimised 
the translation bias as the researchers double-checked the translations. Regarding the selection of in-
formants by key informants, we argue for our approach as the key informants seemed to have the best 
knowledge for purposefully selecting informants in their networks (Abdolmohammadi and Shanteau, 
1992). 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigated the relationship between sharing and protection behaviour in SME net-
works, more specifically, the motives and practices of members switching from sharing to protection. 
We identified three patterns of switching behaviour: members switch from sharing to being open to a 
certain (a) extent, (b) group, or (c) topic. We found that changes in the networks and network character-
istics are associated with the switches. Our findings demonstrate that organisations should not consider 
sharing and protecting as stable states, i.e., members do not ex ante decide to share or protect. Rather, 
sharing and protection behaviour is related with network characteristics and changes in the network. 
Hence, we argue that considering sharing and protection in connection with network characteristics and 
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changes in communities, network structure, or culture, provides a more accurate understanding of shar-
ing and protection phenomena. We found that members of SME networks adapt the use of collaborative 
IT to manage the switches from sharing to protection. This demonstrates that collaborative IT is not 
always in conflict with protection behaviour but can complement it through adapted use. Collaborative 
IT should also provide services, which can be used for knowledge protection according to the needs 
expressed by our interviewees. If users are more confident that they can effectively protect their crucial 
knowledge, they might also be more willing to share. 
Our findings have several implications for practitioners organised in such networks. First, members need 
protection capabilities to manage the switches. More specifically, the three switching patterns seem to 
be associated with particular protection capabilities. Network members especially need ambiguity capa-
bilities to manage switch (a) being open to a certain extent, enforcement capabilities to manage switch 
(b) being open to a certain group and concealment capabilities to manage switch (c) being open to a 
certain topic. We gave examples how collaborative IT could enhance these protection capabilities. Con-
cerning the scientific implications of our study, our switching patterns contribute a new perspective for 
furthering the understanding of knowledge protection. First, balancing sharing and protection is not 
static, but dynamic. Second, research on the design of IT artefacts might consider that collaborative IT 
can be also designed to allow users to switch towards being more protective. 
Future research should also investigate regionally unbounded, homogenous networks it might also be of 
value to explore reverse switching patterns from being protective to being open. Scholars should further 
investigate the enhancement of protection capabilities through the adapted use of collaborative IT. Fu-
ture work could look at how network management can support this enhancement by providing infra-
structure or services for collaborative IT. Another direction for future research could be to investigate 
the switching phenomena over time. How does switching behaviour change in relation to the maturity 
of networks? How do network dynamics like the merger of networks or the expansion of networks affect 
the knowledge protection behaviour of their members? These questions could be of interest to better 
understand knowledge protection in networks as well as help design a network infrastructure that fosters 
protection capabilities to help members balance sharing and protection. 
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